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INTRODUCTION
In June 2014, the Supreme Court handed down Riley v.
California,1 a landmark decision in which the Court ruled that
search warrants are required whenever law enforcement officers want to search a mobile device.2,3 Some commentators
hailed the decision as a great expansion of privacy rights in a
digital, mobile society.4 By striking down the application of
judge-made exceptions for a “warrantless” search of an individual’s smartphone, the Court drew a line in the sand to protect
individual privacy rights. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
John Roberts acknowledged that the decision would “have an
impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime.”5
Riley is notable for two reasons. First, the decision has the
rare import of unanimity. This means that the Court’s nine
members looked past individual unease about cementing a
constitutional search warrant requirement in order to support
the ruling.6 Specifically, both Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas have previously opined that the Fourth
Amendment does not mandate warrants unless a search is
ostensibly “unreasonable.”7 Although the Riley opinion’s tenor
1

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
See id. at 2493.
3
The terms “smartphone,” “mobile phone,” and “mobile device” will be used
interchangeably throughout this Note to reflect the significant overlaps in enduser design between smartphones and tablet computers.
4
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of-riley/ [http://perma.cc/X7DP-NUJ7] (noting that the Riley Court’s “major endorsement of treating computer searches
differently than physical searches” is a “big deal”). But see Richard A. Posner, The
Last Thing a Woman About to Have an Abortion Needs Is to Be Screamed at by the
Godly, SLATE: SUPREME COURT BREAKFAST TABLE (June 26, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/
scotus_roundup/scotus_end_of_term_remembering_town_of_greece_and_
more_on_cellphones_buffer.html [http://perma.cc/J5QN-M3AP] (“No, the [Riley]
opinion is not bold, it’s not the first computer-search case, we are not in a new
digital age, and the [C]ourt is not applying new rules.”).
5
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
6
See Will Baude, A Response to Judge Richard Posner on Riley v. California,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/27/a-response-to-judge-richardposner-on-riley-v-california/ [http://perma.cc/9F6K-FV56].
7
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior
warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that
2

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN104.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 3

28-OCT-15

WHAT COMES AFTER “GET A WARRANT”

12:42

189

suggests that all warrantless mobile device searches are categorically unreasonable,8 some commentators nevertheless expressed surprise that the Court’s most openly “originalist” and
“textualist” Justices signed onto the Riley opinion’s explicit
stand on an issue traditionally left to the discretion of the lower
courts and law enforcement.9
Second, Riley was the Supreme Court’s first computersearch case, and its first at-bat left a large impression on the
public. The New York Times proclaimed the result a “sweeping
victory for privacy rights in the digital age” on its front page.10
Prominent scholar Orin S. Kerr asserted that Riley “is a bold
opinion . . . and it says we are in a new digital age.”11 The
national legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) posited that “the digital revolution has transformed our
expectations of privacy, [and] today’s decision [in Riley] is itself
revolutionary . . . .”12 In late-June 2014, it was difficult to find
pieces that were not effusive about the Riley decision.13
“Revolutionary” is not necessarily colorful hyperbole. Prior
to Riley, courts commonly applied a fairly deferential “reasonableness” determination when deciding whether to suppress
fruits of a warrantless search. Indeed, courts frequently relied
on predigital analogies in order to couch mobile devices in existing search warrant exceptions developed for physical objects.14 Privacy activists and legal scholars argued that
permitting such intrusions would severely undermine any real
are ‘unreasonable.’”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment clearly targets general warrants
but is unclear about actually requiring warrants).
8
See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491–93 (rejecting petitioner’s suggested
compromises due to application issues).
9
See Posner, supra note 4.
10
Adam Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2014, at A1.
11
Id.
12
Press Release, ACLU, Supreme Court Requires Warrant for Cell Phone
Searches by Police (June 25, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/supreme-court-requires-warrant-cell-phone-searches-police [https://
perma.cc/B5MX-CLGW].
13
See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Why the Supreme Court May Finally Protect Your
Privacy in the Cloud, WIRED (June 26, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://www.wired.com/
2014/06/why-the-supreme-court-may-finally-protect-your-privacy-in-thecloud/ [http://perma.cc/RNB9-ATFS] (contemplating the opinion’s subtext to assess the potential impact on privacy interests); Ryan J. Reilly, Supreme Court
Makes Sweeping Endorsement of Digital Privacy, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2014,
10:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/25/supreme-court-cellphone-privacy_n_5529368.html [http://perma.cc/QT5R-UNSL] (characterizing
the opinion as a “sweeping endorsement of digital privacy”).
14
See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007)
(rationalizing a mobile phone as a container).
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constitutional protections.15 Therefore, when the Riley Court
ordered law enforcement officers to “get a warrant,” it seemed
to solve everyone’s privacy concerns.16
But if predigital analogues are now legally insufficient,
what must go into a warrant—itself based on predigital search
methods—to comport with Fourth Amendment protection?
The Court’s lengthy discussion about the amount of personal
information accessible on a modern mobile device suggests
that a search warrant’s particularity may be the next subject
for scrutiny.17 So what do law enforcement officers and prosecutors need to include in a search warrant to balance investigatory interests with privacy considerations? After all, there
remains a strong interest for law enforcement in efficient prosecution of criminal offenses.18 And yet, the Court’s explicit privacy concerns cannot go unheeded.
This Note explores the practical background that underpins the delicate balancing act between state policing and individual privacy interests in state and federal courts. It
concludes that incorporating a search-protocol requirement
into mobile device search warrants may be the only workable
standard. This way, an increasingly tech-savvy corps of magistrate judges may scrutinize how searches are conducted and
thereby ensure the target’s privacy rights.
This Note is organized in four Parts. Part I summarizes the
road up to and including the Court’s logic in Riley, to mandating warrants when searching mobile devices. Part II discusses
the current requirements for valid search warrants and will
address the applicability of analogizing computer search warrant jurisprudence to mobile devices. Part III analyzes the current tensions in lower courts over search warrant particularity
for mobile devices and discusses why a search protocol requirement is a persuasive method of balancing law enforcement and
privacy interests. Part IV provides a conclusion.
15
See Steven I. Friedland, Cell Phone Searches in a Digital World: Incorporating Function as well as Form in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
217, 244 (2014) (“Trying to fit the existence of smartphones into an earlier reality
that focuses on form provides for a bad fit and, generally, bad results.”); Daniel
Zamani, Note, There’s an Amendment for That: A Comprehensive Application of
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169,
198 (2010).
16
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
17
See id. at 2489–91 (discussing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of
smartphone content).
18
See id. at 2493 (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a
cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search . . . .”).
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I
RILEY: GROUNDBREAKING AND NOT, ALL AT ONCE
A. Historical Justifications for Warrantless Mobile Phone
Searches
Prior to Riley, lower courts justified warrantless mobile
phone searches under a variety of preexisting “exceptions.”
These exceptions were laid out in a trilogy of cases: Chimel v.
California,19 United States v. Robinson,20 and Arizona v. Gant.21
In Chimel, the Court put forth two scenarios in which a warrantless search was valid: first, to protect a police officer by
removing any weapons that the arrestee might use to effect an
escape, and second, to prevent the destruction of evidence.22
In United States v. Robinson, the Court applied this framework
to the physical search of an arrested individual. Upholding the
search of a container found on a suspect during a custodial
arrest, the Court held that a search of a container in the immediate vicinity of an arrestee was reasonable in all cases where
there was probable cause for the arrest, even where the justifications developed in Chimel did not apply.23 Finally, in Arizona
v. Gant, the Court extended Chimel and Robinson to permit
warrantless searches of a suspect’s vehicle when it is seized as
an instrumentality of an offense.24
Taken together, the foregoing cases led lower courts to reject a number of defendant challenges to information obtained
from warrantless cell phone searches, albeit under varying rationales.25 For example, in United States v. Finley,26 the Fifth
Circuit applied the Robinson rationale that a mobile phone was
19

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
21
556 U.S. 332 (2009).
22
See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63.
23
See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 & n.4 (1981) (upholding a police officer’s search of any container—“any
object capable of holding another object”—that was within a suspect’s reach at
the time of arrest). Indeed, the Robinson container rule compelled some courts to
permit searches incident to arrest, regardless of any reason to believe that evidence would be found. See Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011); Derek A. Scheurer, Are Courts Phoning It In? Resolving Problematic
Reasoning in the Debate over Warrantless Searches of Cell Phones Incident to
Arrest, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 287, 303–04 (2014).
24
See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. The Court permitted searches “only when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Id. This comports with the two Chimel concerns
for officer safety and preventing destruction of evidence.
25
See generally Friedland, supra note 15, at 230–36 (discussing the varied
applications of the Chimel-Robinson doctrine in lower courts).
26
477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
20

R
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nothing more than a container. Using that predigital analogue,
a police officer had the right to inspect the phone’s contents—
namely, the call history and text messages—during a search
incident to arrest.27 The California Supreme Court utilized
similar logic in People v. Diaz28 by refusing to distinguish between types of “containers” found on an arrestee’s person. The
Diaz court thereby rejected a defendant’s motion to suppress
text messages obtained from a warrantless search.29 In addition, in United States v. Flores-Lopez,30 the Seventh Circuit
analogized a mobile phone to a diary within close proximity to
the suspect’s person at the time of arrest. Therefore, the police’s cursory search of the telephone was reasonable and did
not spark the need for a search warrant.31
B. Technology and the Fourth Amendment Leading up to
Riley
The Riley Court’s eventual break from a long line of searchincident-to-arrest cases did not occur in a vacuum; rather, it
followed from a line of cases in which the Supreme Court grappled with the rise of new technologies in light of the Fourth
Amendment.32 In Kyllo v. United States,33 the Court ruled that
27
See id. at 254, 259–60; see also Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891
(Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that cell phones constitute an “electronic ‘container’”
which could store “thousands of individual containers in the form of discrete files”
(quoting Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 555 (2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures])).
28
244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011).
29
See id. at 507.
30
670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).
31
See id. at 807.
32
See Andrew Pincus, Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment: The
Implications of Riley v. California, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 311–20 (discussing the impact of three Supreme Court cases—Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001), United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), and Maryland v. King, 133 S.
Ct. 1958 (2013)—on the contours of the Riley decision). In fact, there were growing signs of resistance from lower courts and commentators over the significant
latitude law enforcement officers had to comb through private data in mobile
devices without a warrant. See, e.g., Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 807 (noting that a
phone may be akin to a “diary,” but that the extent of the police’s intrusion into
stored private information may determine whether a warrant should have been
issued); Hawkins, 704 S.E.2d at 891 (“Electronic ‘containers’ . . . often will contain the most sensitive kinds of personal information, in which individuals may
reasonably have a substantial expectation of privacy and for which the law offers
heightened protection.”). Notably, in 2013, the First Circuit categorically refused
to permit warrantless smartphone searches due to privacy concerns. See United
States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013). Wurie and the California Supreme
Court’s denial of review in Riley v. California led to the Supreme Court’s granting
of certiorari in Riley. See People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 8, 2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014).
33
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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“[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology.”34 In finding the use
of thermal imaging technology to find marijuana “grow lights” a
form of property search, the Court emphasized that “[i]n the
home . . . all details are intimate details.”35
In United States v. Jones,36 the Court grappled with police
use of GPS tracking devices to locate suspects. Citing the
Fourth Amendment’s history and language—the protection of
“persons, houses, papers, and effects”37—the Court declared
that the use of GPS tracking devices on vehicles constituted a
search.38 Specifically, the Court reasoned, GPS tracking is a
type of search that reveals detailed information about a target’s
movements—a significant penetration into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.39 Therefore, a search warrant is
required.40
In contrast, in Maryland v. King,41 the Court considered
the privacy implications of using DNA technology as part of a
routine booking procedure upon a suspect’s arrest. The Court
observed that there are certain circumstances where there is a
“diminish[ed] . . . need for a warrant,” either because of a
heightened public interest42 or when “some reasonable police
intrusion on [an individual’s] privacy is to be expected.”43 DNA
evidence, like fingerprinting, only provides a more accurate
means of identifying a suspect and does not reveal other types
of personal information.44 Therefore, a warrant is not
required.45
The preceding three cases present a common theme: to the
extent that a particular investigative technique could reveal
more information about a target than might originally be obtained in a reasonable search, Fourth Amendment warrant issues are triggered.
34

Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 37.
36
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
37
Id. at 950.
38
See id. at 953–54.
39
See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Pincus, supra note 32, at 317–18.
40
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954; Pincus, supra note 32, at 316.
41
133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
42
Id. at 1969 (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)).
43
Id.
44
See id. at 1977–78, 1980; Pincus, supra note 32, at 325–26.
45
See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (holding that “analyzing a cheek swab of the
arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”).
35

R
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C. The Contours Take Shape: Riley v. California’s Warrant
Requirement
The Riley Court’s decision to strike down search-incidentto-arrest exceptions for smartphones was driven exclusively by
concerns of overaccess to personal information. The Court
considered, “on the one hand, the degree to which [the warrant
exemption] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”46 Acknowledging the
Chimel-Robinson warrant exceptions, the Court refused to extend the physical search exceptions to digital data searches
because “harm to officers and destruction of evidence—[factors] present in all custodial arrests”—have “no comparable
risks when the search is of digital data.”47 Absent the risks
present in a physical search, digital data privacy qualms remained in the balance.
The Court laid out three specific concerns that distinguished smartphones from any other kind of search previously
contested before the Court. First, the Court considered how
“[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative
sense from other objects” with their immense storage capacity
and ability to contain personal data.48 Second, the Court noted
that “a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible” compared
to a predigital analogue.49 Finally, the Court acknowledged the
pervasiveness of mobile phone usage and how “a digital record
of nearly every aspect of [individuals’] lives” is routinely on their
person.50 The Court then recognized that such a digital record
may include not just the data stored within the phone’s appli46
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
47
Id. at 2484–85. The Court distinguished the Robinson warrant exception
for in-person container searches, noting that the “search of the information on a
cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered
in Robinson.” Id. at 2485. The Court also rejected its container rationale in New
York v. Belton by arguing that “the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is
used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.” Id. at 2491 (citing
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981)). However, the Court still
recognized the Chimel concerns, noting that law enforcement officers could still
perform a physical inspection of a mobile device to avoid physical harm. See id. at
2485. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the loss of digital evidence could be
sufficiently precluded by securing the physical device, rendering warrantless data
inspections unnecessary. See id. at 2486–87.
48
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 2490.
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cations but also that the mere array of installed apps “together
can form a revealing montage of the user’s life.”51
Balancing these considerations, the Court declared that “a
cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search” of any predigital analogue.52 The Court then rejected every compromise limitation
set forth by the Government and amici to ensure “meaningful
constraints” on law enforcement officers.53 However, despite
its exhaustive contemplation of the myriad ways in which privacy interests may be harmed,54 the Court offered only two
paragraphs to articulate its preferred result: obtaining a warrant.55 Therefore, the lengthy privacy interest discussion suggests the Court’s “simple” solution56 may not be so simple.
II
FINDING A BASELINE FOR WARRANT PARTICULARITY
A. Warrants: A Brief Background
The American “particularized” search warrant requirement
was a response to colonial experiences with British “writs of
assistance,” which permitted nearly limitless searches of colonists’ homes.57 The Fourth Amendment articulated a number
of parameters governing search and seizure in an effort to limit
51
Id. By contemplating the mere assortment of apps as part of a user’s
private information, the Court expanded privacy consideration to any inspection
of a mobile phone forthright. Therefore, even viewing the telephone’s apps without accessing any information contained therein no longer would fit within the
“plain view” exception for a search warrant. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 141–42 (1990) (articulating the “plain view” exception to require that (1) the
officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the same location as
the evidence; (2) the incriminating character of the evidence is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer had lawful access to the object itself). For mobile devices,
the first prong is now foreclosed.
52
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
53
Id. at 2491–93. Among the proposals the Court rejected was an extension
of Gant, such that the Government would be permitted to conduct a warrantless
search of a cell phone when there was reason to believe it was the instrumentality
of a criminal offense. See id. at 2492. The Court held that such a standard
“would prove no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches.” Id.
54
The Court’s slip opinion devoted seventeen pages to rejecting the searchincident-to-arrest exceptions, followed by eight pages discussing the various ways
in which mobile phones contain extensive personal information too sensitive for
warrantless review. See Riley v. California, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op.
17–25 (U.S. June 25, 2014).
55
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493–95.
56
Id. at 2495.
57
See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 48–50 (2008); Zamani, supra note 15, at 173.
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the federal government’s ability to intrude into one’s home.58
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment declares that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.59

Indeed, the Supreme Court historically expressed a strong
preference for law enforcement to err in favor of obtaining a
warrant.60 The Court’s preference is derived from the orderly
procedure afforded by the warrant process, whereby a magistrate must make an isolated, deliberate determination to find
probable cause.61 Proceeding via magistrate review would theoretically better protect targets’ property and privacy rights
than the hurried approach that law enforcement officers take
as they conduct the search.62
The warrant application process is comparable at both the
federal and state levels.63 Typically, the Government completes
a standard form and attaches an affidavit describing the nature
of the Government’s search.64 The warrant must be “particu58
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928). The Supreme
Court subsequently ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied to states through
the incorporation doctrine. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
Later, the Supreme Court shifted its property-based analysis to a privacy-based
analysis, thus interpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967); Zamani, supra note 15, at 174. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012), is the Court’s most recent reminder that Fourth Amendment privacy
rights extend to all reasonable expectations of privacy, whether at home or on
one’s person or property. See id. at 953–54.
59
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60
See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (holding that in
“doubtful or marginal case[s] a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fall”).
61
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.1(a) (5th ed. 2012) (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110
(1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
62
See id. (citing Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110–11).
63
See, e.g., SEATTLE TIMES: LEGAL GUIDE, http://old.seattletimes.com/html/
legalguide/2003547837_legalguide_part4.html (last updated Sept. 19, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/6465-S7YY] (“In Washington state, any prosecuting attorney . . . can obtain a warrant from a judge . . . . Federal search warrants similarly
can be obtained by a government attorney . . . from a federal judge or magistrate,
or from a state judge.” (citations omitted)).
64
See, e.g., United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 218–19 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (describing the government’s warrant application, consisting of a form and
two attachments); see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)
(“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized
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larized” in that it identifies (1) the place to be searched (frequently “Attachment A”) and (2) the items to be seized, as well
as any probable cause to substantiate the purpose for seizing
the requested items (frequently “Attachment B”).65 The “probable cause” requirement is fairly broad, requiring only that the
items to be seized must be readily identifiable with a particular
criminal endeavor and that, at the time of the warrant’s execution, such objects are at the location identified.66
In 2009, the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopted a number of amendments to the warrant application
process to account for the rise in forensic computer searches.67
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 now articulates a “twostage process,” which allows for the physical seizure of the
electronic device and then a subsequent copying and analysis
of the data “consistent with the warrant.”68 Nevertheless, the
new rule remains broad in deference to the practical difficulties
that could arise during forensic analysis.69 Indeed, the Committee Notes concede that “[t]he amended rule does not address
the specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may
require in a warrant for electronically stored information, leaving the application of this and other constitutional standards
concerning both the seizure and the search to ongoing case law
makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another.”).
65
See, e.g., Lustyik 57 F. Supp. 3d at 219; see also Orin S. Kerr, Search
Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, 75 MISS. L.J. 85, 90 (2005) [hereinafter
Kerr, Digital Evidence] (“In physical searches, the investigators seek permission to
look through a particular physical space for a particular piece of evidence, and
then to take that evidence away.”).
66
See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 61, § 3.7; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
230–31 (1983) (“This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with [the Court’s] treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that
specific ‘tests’ be satisfied . . . .”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)
(“The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities . . . . [T]he
evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis
by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”).
67
See AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, H.R. DOC.
NO. 111-30 (2009); see also Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 65, at 95–105
(arguing that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, prior to its 2009 amendment, did not properly consider the multiple steps inherent in data-based search
warrants).
68
H.R. DOC. NO. 111-30 at 44.
69
See id. at 55 (“In light of the enormous quantities of information that are
often involved, as well as the difficulties often encountered involving encryption
and booby traps, it is impractical to set a definite time period during which the
offsite review must be completed. The Committee Note emphasizes, however, that
the court may impose a deadline for the return of the medium or access to the
electronically stored information.”).
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development.”70 As such, enhanced particularity requirements
for mobile devices must either be derived by analogy from preexisting case law or be independently developed.
B. The Computer Analogy
One way to approach warrant particularity for mobile devices is to simply adopt the courts’ approaches to computer
search warrants. After all, a number of courts analogize
smartphones to computers.71 Predictably, there are significant
parallels between how courts first addressed computer
searches in the late 1990s and early 2000s and how they addressed cell phone searches less than ten years later.72 For
example, in People v. Gall,73 the Colorado Supreme Court held
that computers are “reasonably likely to serve as ‘containers’
for writings, or the functional equivalent of ‘written or printed
material.’”74 And yet, as with mobile phones today, courts in
the late 1990s and early 2000s increasingly expressed concern
about the ubiquity of computers and the breadth of their storage capacity.75
Unfortunately, computer search jurisprudence remains an
unsettled area of the law. Computer search authorizations are
doctrinally and practically difficult76 because digital evidence
70

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory Committee Notes to 2009 amendment.
See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[A] modern
cell phone is a computer . . . .” (quoting United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d
803, 805 (2012))); United States v. Horton, No. 12-228, 2013 WL 3833250, at *2
(E.D. Pa. July 25, 2013) (“Given the functional similarities between a cell phone
and a computer, it may be reasonable to refer to a cell phone’s circuit board and
other internal parts as ‘computer’ hardware.”).
72
See generally Samantha Trepel, Note, Digital Searches, General Warrants,
and the Case for the Courts, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 120, 126–32 (2007) (reviewing
the development of computer search doctrine).
73
30 P.3d 145 (Colo. 2001).
74
Id. at 153; see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of
Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193,
196 (2005) (“One view asserts that a computer is a form of a container and that
the data in electronic storage are mere forms of documents. . . . This article
concludes that [this] first view is correct: computers are containers.”).
75
Compare Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (“One of the most
notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage
capacity.”), with United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“[A]nalogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to ‘oversimplify a
complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive
modern computer storage.’” (quoting Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of
Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 104 (1994))); see also
Trepel, supra note 72, at 130 (describing courts’ reactions to developing technology and growing storage capacity).
76
Interestingly, a significant driving factor in developing computer search
jurisprudence has been its application in child pornography cases. See Clancy,
71
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of criminal activity could commonly be mislabeled and hidden,
making searches more burdensome than a traditional physical
search.77 In light of the fact that “criminals can—and often
do—hide, mislabel, or manipulate files to conceal criminal activity, a broad, expansive search of the hard drive may be required.”78 By the same token, “granting the Government a
carte blanche to search every file on the hard drive” can lead to
an impermissibly general search.79 Courts have struggled to
balance these competing interests.
Courts erring in favor of privacy interests focus on the
inherent risk of overly intrusive searches when dealing with the
vast storage capacity of modern computers. These courts advocate for tighter controls to limit the extent to which law enforcement can review personal digital data. The Tenth Circuit
offered one possible limitation in United States v. Carey80 by
extending the “intermingled document” doctrine to computer
searches.81 Adapted from a case involving large quantities of
physical files,82 the intermingled document doctrine requires
investigators to “engage in the intermediate step of sorting various types of documents and then only search the ones specified in a warrant.”83 If the volume of information is too great to
sort on-site, then officers may hold the documents “pending
approval by a magistrate of the conditions and limitations on a
further search through the documents.”84
supra note 74, at 200 (“For example, searches of computers for evidence of child
pornography and other sexual exploitation of children make up a shockingly large
percentage of the decided cases . . . .”). Perhaps owing to the grievous nature of
the offense, child pornography cases tested courts’ willingness to maintain high
privacy barriers, giving way to the permissive latitude currently afforded to law
enforcement. Cf. Trepel, supra note 72, at 136 (“Unfortunately, the particularly
distasteful nature of [child pornography cases] may unconsciously influence decision makers . . . to believe that stronger protections against general computer
searches are unnecessary.”).
77
See, e.g., United States v. Karrer, 460 F. App’x 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[G]iven the nature of computer files and the tendency of criminal offenders to
mislabel, hide, and attempt to delete evidence of their crimes, it would be impossible to identify ex ante the precise files, file types, programs and devices that would
house the suspected evidence.”).
78
United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 237 (3d Cir. 2011).
79
Id. (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
80
172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
81
See id. at 1275.
82
See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
83
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275.
84
Id. Of course, investigators rarely sort computer files on-site; instead, they
usually seize the entire computer and separate the files in a forensic laboratory.
See Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 65, at 87.
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In Carey, law enforcement officers were conducting a computer search for evidence of drug trafficking.85 Their warrant
authorized a search for “files on the computers for ‘names,
telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of
controlled substances.’”86 During the course of their investigation, the examiners discovered images of child pornography.
Without obtaining a second warrant, the officers searched for
more child pornography files.87 After extending the intermingled document doctrine, the Tenth Circuit held that the lower
court erred in refusing to grant the defendant’s suppression
motion for the child porn files retrieved by police after they
recovered the first, inadvertently discovered image.88 The court
ruled that the police failed to either employ document segregation methods to limit their search for drug evidence or request
magistrate review for an additional warrant for the pornographic images.89 Instead, the police sorted the documents
and then conducted “an unconstitutional general search.”90
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski offered an alternative approach
to limiting law enforcement’s digital search-and-seizure discretion in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT
III).91 In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski recommended a number of guidelines to limit police access to private
information.92 Most notable was his preference for “a protocol
for preventing agents involved in the investigation from examining or retaining any data other than that for which probable

85

See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270.
Id.
87
See id. at 1271.
88
See id. at 1276.
89
See id.
90
Id.
91
621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). Chief Judge Kozinski’s opinion actually served as the majority opinion—and was thus binding in the
Ninth Circuit—in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989
(9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter CDT III] revised and superseded by CDT III, 621 F.3d
1162. However, Chief Judge Kozinski lost his majority in the subsequent CDT III
en banc rehearing, relegating his approach to an advisory role. See Paul Ohm,
Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97
VA. L. REV. BRIEF 1, 3 n.9 (2011).
92
See CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge
Kozinski’s guidelines acknowledge that overseizure of digital data is inevitable but
that the government must concede certain liberties in return, such as forswearing
reliance “on any . . . doctrine that would allow retention of data obtained only
because the government was required to segregate seizable from non-seizable
data.” Id.
86
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cause is shown.”93 Having a search protocol in a warrant application would afford magistrate judges an ex ante opportunity to review the police’s intended approach to avoid
overseizure of evidence.94
While many courts acknowledge both of the foregoing approaches, most courts have settled for a generally permissive
attitude towards computer search warrants.95 Faced with voluminous digital storage and easily masked data files, many
judges construe broadly termed search warrants as a practical
approach to a complex problem.96 The primary limiting principle is that the search authorization be particularized to a specific offense, with probable cause substantiating the sought-for
items’ connections to the alleged offense.97 For example, in
United States v. Richards,98 the Sixth Circuit addressed a criminal appeal where the defendant alleged that the police executed an overly broad search warrant. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the conviction and approved the investigator’s expanded search, holding that “[t]he degree of specificity required
[in a warrant] is flexible and will vary depending on the crime
involved and the types of items sought.”99 This flexibility re93
Id. at 1179. Under Chief Judge Kozinski’s parameters, the search protocol
would be the judicially enforceable outer bounds of the search methods investigators may apply. Any deviations or modifications would require judicial authorization. See id.
94
See id. at 1178.
95
See, e.g., United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Although we conclude that the exercise of ‘greater vigilance’ did not require
invoking the CDT III search protocols . . . , judges may consider such protocols or a
variation on those protocols as appropriate in electronic searches.”); United States
v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that search protocols can limit the danger of a general warrant but refusing to require such a
search protocol); Ohm, supra note 91, at 11 (“Computer search warrants are the
closest things to general warrants we have confronted in the history of the
Republic.”).
96
See Stabile, 633 F.3d at 239; United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 783–85
(7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the suggestion to use CDT III’s “more comprehensive
rules regarding computer searches” because of the intricacies of computer
searches); Trepel, supra note 72, at 134–36.
97
See, e.g., United States v. Karrer, 460 F. App’x 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2012)
(holding a warrant not “overbroad simply because the devices and files it authorized to be searched and seized were likely to include materials unrelated to [the
specified] offense”); United States v. Welch, 291 F. App’x 193, 198–99, 201 (10th
Cir. 2008) (requiring a “totality of the circumstances” approach to assessing the
fair probability that a search would yield evidence pertaining to a specific criminal
offense but granting deference to magistrate judges and law enforcement officers
to make probable cause determinations even when warrants are poorly drafted
(quoting United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2001))).
98
659 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2011).
99
Id. at 537 (quoting United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir.
2001)).
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flects “the unique problem encountered in computer searches,
and the practical difficulties inherent in implementing universal search methodologies.”100
Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v.
Burgess,101 the Sixth Circuit emphasized the unique difficulties of conducting digital searches compared to physical
searches.102 Quoting Burgess, the Sixth Circuit noted that
“[a]s the description of such places and things [in a computer
search warrant] becomes more general, the method by which
the search is executed become[s] more important . . . .”103
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held, the focus shifts from ex ante
scrutiny of the warrant’s language to an ex post reasonableness assessment of how law enforcement officers executed the
search.104
Similarly, many courts are sympathetic to the burdens
that forensic examiners face in parsing through a large volume
of data and are lenient when the physical process an investigator employs reasonably extends beyond the warrant’s scope. In
United States v. Stabile,105 the Third Circuit upheld a forensic
examiner’s broad search of the defendant’s hard drive for financial information that revealed a cache of child pornography.106 In this case, the police executed a computer search
warrant looking for evidence of financial crimes. But in the
process of conducting the search, the forensic examiner flagged
and reviewed a folder marked “Kazvid,” which actually contained child pornography.107
100

Id. at 538.
576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009).
102
See Richards, 659 F.3d at 538–39. The concerns outlined by the court—
namely, purposefully mislabeled files hidden in a large volume of data—are outlined above.
103
Id. at 539 (third alteration in original) (quoting Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094).
104
See id. at 540 (“In other words, in general, ‘[s]o long as the computer search
is limited to a search for evidence explicitly authorized in the warrant, it is reasonable for the executing officers to open the various types of files located in the
computer’s hard drive in order to determine whether they contain such evidence.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Roberts, No. 3:08-CR175, 2010 WL 234719, at *15 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 14, 2010))).
105
633 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2011).
106
See id. at 227, 231–32.
107
See id. at 226–27. At trial, the investigator testified that “he highlighted
the Kazvid folder not because it necessarily contained child pornography but
because—as a suspicious folder—it could harbor evidence of any sort of crime,
including a financial crime.” Id. at 227. Here, unlike the detectives in United
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999), after the Stabile examiners
discovered the initial folder containing child pornography, they halted their
search for additional folders until they obtained a new warrant. Stabile, 633 F.3d
at 227–28.
101
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The Third Circuit acknowledged that the search’s results
exceeded the bounds of the warrant, conceding that “it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined” to determine if they fell within the warrant’s scope.108 But the court
decided the search was “objectively reasonable because
criminals can easily alter file names and file extensions to conceal contraband.”109 Specifically, the Third Circuit noted that
the detective “took steps to ensure that his investigation complied with the state search warrant” and that “he examined
suspicious and out-of-place folders” based on his experience
that files—including those relating to financial crimes—could
be hidden anywhere.110 Therefore, the “procedures demonstrate that [the examiner] engaged in a focused search of the
hard drives rather than a general search.”111
The inherent difficulties arising in the foregoing cases are
what drive most courts to outright reject the required use of
search protocols.112 The oft-quoted passage from United States
v. Burgess—that it is “folly for a search warrant to attempt to
structure the mechanics of the search” because “imposing
such limits would unduly restrict legitimate search objectives”113—underlies the courts’ desire to remain forgiving to
law enforcement needs. Therefore, for computer searches, an
ex post reasonableness review of the search appears to have
the greatest traction in the courts.114

108
Id. at 234 (quoting United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519–20 (4th
Cir. 2010)).
109
Id. at 239; see also United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that a general seizure of “‘documents may be justified’ if it is
demonstrated that ‘the government could not reasonably segregate . . . documents
on the basis of whether or not they were likely to evidence criminal activity’”
(quoting United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427–28 (9th Cir. 1995))).
110
Stabile, 633 F.3d at 239.
111
Id. at 239–40.
112
See, e.g., id. at 238–39 (rejecting search protocols as “folly” (quoting United
States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009))).
113
Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094; see also Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra
note 27, at 575 (“In light of [computer search] difficulties, magistrate judges are
poorly equipped to evaluate whether a particular search protocol is the fastest and
most targeted way of locating evidence stored on a hard drive. Given the contingent nature of the process, even a skilled forensic expert cannot predict exactly
what techniques will be necessary to find the information sought by the
warrant.”).
114
See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2014)
(describing the government’s burden to establish police officers’ “reasonableness”
in executing search warrants); Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 27, at 566
(arguing that “[t]he better approach is to reform rules regulating the admissibility
of evidence ex post”).
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C. The Computer Analogy Is Not a Good Fit for Mobile
Devices
If the courts focus on practical reasons to justify latitude in
computer search warrants, then the computer analogy cannot
be entirely transposed to mobile devices for two reasons: (1)
there are different forensic steps involved with mobile device
searches compared to computer searches and (2) mobile
phones are functionally different from computers.
1. Distinguishing Mobile Device Forensics from Computer
Forensics
The differences in the traditional computer market versus
the mobile device market have different implications for forensic examiners charged with searching the devices.115 Specifically, in PC-based forensics, the norm is to physically remove
the hard drive from the computer, make and verify a mirror
image of it, then subsequently analyze the mirrored content.116
The fact that there are two predominant operating systems—
Windows and Mac OS—that make software development easy
and predictable furthers the norm.117
However, with mobile devices, the paradigm is very different for multiple reasons. First, data acquisition methods vary
based upon the information sought, the proprietary nature of
device hardware, and the device software.118 Moreover, there
are different kinds of forensic software due to the large number
of operating systems and different types of mobile phone technology in the market.119 Indeed, as a subcategory of the different device operating systems, the actual variant of the mobile
device’s operating system may be proprietarily modified.120 As
115
See Jason Gonzalez & James Hung, Mobile Device Forensics: A Brave New
World?, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP.—TECH. L., no. 10, 2011, at 1, http://www.strozfried
berg.com/files/Publication/224ca0f8-5101-4e1b-938a-4d4b128ad5ed/Presen
tation/PublicationAttachment/ef4a28ad-ff7d-4014-aea8-80505789b86c/Mobile
%20Device%20Forensics_%20A%20Brave%20New%20World.pdf [http://perma.
cc/YBK6-Y8KL].
116
See id.
117
See id.
118
See generally RICK AYERS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., GUIDELINES ON MOBILE DEVICE FORENSICS 15–20 (2014) [hereinafter NIST GUIDELINES],
http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-101r1 [http://perma.cc/89BU-86X2]
(outlining five general categories of methods of data extraction).
119
See id. at 5 (listing Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android, RIM’s BlackBerry OS,
and Microsoft’s Windows Mobile as the predominant mobile operating systems
currently on the market).
120
See id. at 43 (“Each one of the different versions of the [Android] operating
system requires slight modifications for each family of device for full support.
This has led to hundreds (if not thousands) of different distributions in the wild.”);
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a result, mobile device forensics can be more difficult than
searching a traditional computer, with different implications
for how data is extracted.
The complications are captured in the National Institute of
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Guidelines on Mobile Device
Forensics.121 The NIST Guidelines note that “examiners typically assemble a collection of both forensic and non-forensic
tools for their toolkit.”122 This “collection” of tools reflects the
dynamic nature of the mobile device market—there are constant updates and, therefore, different tools are capable of extracting only certain types of data.123 The NIST Guidelines
proceed to classify various data extraction tools on a scale of
Level 1 through Level 5, with each level becoming progressively
“more technical, invasive, time consuming, and expensive.”124
To further add complication, “once a level is used, alternate
levels may not be possible. . . . With each methodology, data
may be permanently destroyed or modified if a given tool or
procedure is not proper[ly] utilized.”125
Level 1, Manual Extraction, involves essentially reading
the information directly off of the device’s screen. It is the least
invasive method of analysis.126 Level 2, Logical Extraction, requires connecting the mobile device to a forensics workstation
and then manually extracting certain information by entering
computer commands into the workstation. This yields more
information but is more invasive than a Manual Extraction.127
Similar to computers, the most common form of data extraction and analysis for mobile devices involves “imaging”—
copying—the device’s contents onto a virtual workspace. The
NIST Guidelines categorize imaging at Levels 3 and 4, the two
Jerry Hildenbrand, Inside the Different Android Versions, ANDROID CENTRAL (June
11, 2013, 12:04 AM), http://www.androidcentral.com/android-versions [http://
perma.cc/HNG4-7ZG5] (describing different ways in which the Android operating
system is implemented on different devices).
121
NIST is a nonregulatory federal agency within the United States Department of Commerce. It is responsible for “advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security” for the United
States. See NIST General Information, NIST: PUB. AFF. OFF., http://www.nist.gov/
public_affairs/general_information.cfm [http://perma.cc/Q8VN-W6XU].
122
NIST GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 15.
123
See id.
124
Id. However, the NIST Guidelines note that Level 5, a “Micro Read,” is
primarily theoretical in nature and is not utilized by any American law enforcement agency. Therefore, there practically are only four different levels of forensic
analysis. Id. at 19–20.
125
Id. at 16.
126
See id. at 17.
127
See id.
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most practically invasive data extraction levels.128 Level 3, Hex
Dumping/Joint Test Action Group, is where the forensic analyst would use a “flasher box” to copy the memory contents of a
device onto a computer.129 Subsequently, the computer would
decode and recreate the various data levels of the phone’s
memory in the computer for analysis.130 There are risks that
there may be decoding issues, and it is entirely dependent on
the software and hardware the analyst uses.131 Level 4 is
termed a “Chip-Off.”132 This requires physically removing the
flash memory, which is then converted into a binary image for
analysis. Chip-Offs are the most invasive method of analysis
and yield the most information from the device.133
But demonstrative of the variance in mobile device forensic
tools, there are no fewer than five available software packages
to accomplish each layer of analysis, from Level 1 through 4.134
However, each available software package, despite purporting
to accomplish different layers of data extraction analysis, has
different capabilities. Therefore, what the forensic examiner
can actually do (or how tailored the data extraction may be) is
likely hamstrung by which software package the laboratory
decided to purchase.135 Moreover, the Guidelines note that
“not all relevant data viewable on a mobile device using the
available menus may be acquired and decoded through a logical acquisition.”136 This means that a forensic examiner may
be forced to manually go through the device for any pertinent
information, despite having software-based search capabilities.
Finally, because mobile devices have short product cycles, each
of the varied-capability forensic software packages runs the
risk of quickly being outdated.137

128

See id. at 17–19.
See id. at 18.
130
See id. at 16.
131
See id. at 18.
132
See id. at 19.
133
See id.
134
See id. at 21–23 tbl.3. The NIST Guidelines identify five available software
packages for Level 1, thirty programs capable of a Level 2 analysis, twelve available for Level 3, and seven available for Level 4.
135
See id. at 25.
136
Id. at 41.
137
Even still, the Guidelines acknowledge that, “[o]n occasion, updates or new
versions of a tool were also found to be less capable in some aspects than a
previous version was.” Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
129
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2. Mobile Phones Are Functionally Different from
Computers
In addition to distinguishable forensic techniques between
mobile phones and computers, the burdens associated with
computer searches—namely, the ability to mask file names—
are qualitatively different on a mobile device. As previously
discussed, one of the biggest concerns in a traditional computer search is that potentially incriminating evidence may be
masked by an innocuous file name or by modifying the file
extension.138 But file names and extensions are not so easily
modified on a mobile device, because mobile operating systems
are designed for ease of use and do not emphasize user-directed file organization.139
For example, on Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android operating systems, file name modifications require special third-party
software that actually display the device’s file directory.140 And
even if that software is installed, the ability to move files from
one application to another is limited by the operating system’s
design structure.141 Moreover, a number of forensic examination programs now search for file types based on a file signature database, rather than file extension.142 In doing so, the
138
See, e.g., United States v. Karrer, 460 F. App’x 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[G]iven the nature of computer files and the tendency of criminal offenders to
mislabel, hide, and attempt to delete evidence of their crimes, it would be impossible to identify ex ante the precise files, file types, programs and devices that would
house the suspected evidence.”); Trepel, supra note 72, at 135 (“Not only can
[perpetrators] give files innocuous sounding titles (for example ‘Johnny’s Science
Fair Project’ lacks the malevolent ring of ‘SexyTeenPics’), but suspects with something to hide can also easily change the extensions under which files are saved.”).
139
See, e.g., Donovan Colbert, Which is the Superior Mobile OS: iOS, Android,
or Windows 8?, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:06 AM), http://
www.techrepublic.com/blog/tablets-in-the-enterprise/which-is-the-superiormobile-os-ios-android-or-windows-8/ [http://perma.cc/9QZW-USSW] (discussing three prominent mobile operating systems emphasizing simplicity of use).
However, the Android operating system is acknowledged to permit greater userdirected organization but still not to the extent of a traditional computer. See id.
140
For example, iFile for iOS devices is a $1.99 application that organizes and
offers limited file-naming capabilities. See File Browser, IPHONE APPLICATIONS AND
TIPS, http://iphone.heinelt.eu/?Applications:iFile:File_Browser [http://
perma.cc/WA35-997S]. On Android devices, there are a number of applications
that support renaming file extensions and names on the Google Play store. See
Hardy, How to Change File Extension on Android Device, ANDROID TIPSZ (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.androidtipsz.com/how-to-change-file-extension-on-androiddevice [http://perma.cc/BVN9-TJQX].
141
See, e.g., Apple Inc., File System Basics, IOS DEVELOPER LIBRARY, https://
developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/FileManagement/Conceptual/
FileSystemProgrammingGuide/FileSystemOverview/FileSystemOverview.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8JT-ER6K] (explaining that applications’ file directories are
self-contained and generally cannot extend to other applications’ directories).
142
See NIST GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 52.

R
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software “eliminates the possibility of missing data because of
an inconsistent [e.g., user-modified,] file name extension.”143
Indeed, the same software may “find and gather images automatically into a common graphics library for examination,”
thus eliminating the possibility of files being hidden.144 Therefore, the same kind of flexibility afforded for computer searches
because of hidden or mislabeled files is not directly applicable
to mobile phone searches.
3. In Short: Mobile Device Searches Are Distinct from
Computer Searches
The takeaway is that mobile devices have greater data extraction volatility and limitations but have fewer actual data
locations and content variables than traditional computer
searches. Because of the perpetual changes in mobile product
offerings, forensic software is slow to catch up and the actual
capabilities of the available forensic software vary greatly.
Practically speaking, what a forensic laboratory can do is constrained by its software budget. Therefore, the lab’s precision
in extracting data likely requires greater planning in order to
ensure no pertinent data is lost, within the constraints of the
warrant. Even still, the software limitations may necessitate
overseizing data simply because the tools available provide no
other recourse.
By the same token, once the data is actually extracted,
there are fewer mysteries in terms of file labeling or extracting
certain types of files. As an added bonus, the storage volume
on a mobile device is generally less than that of a computer.
Therefore, with sufficient experience, it is conceivable that law
enforcement officers can articulate a process by which they
intend to search a device. However, imposing or predetermining constraints on where forensic examiners may search could
prove overly limiting, given the data extraction capabilities that
they may have.
III
CURRENT APPROACHES TO PARTICULARITY AND A
PATH FORWARD
Mobile devices’ distinguishing characteristics bring the
discussion back to the original problem: What standard of particularity should apply to mobile phone search warrants? For
143
144

Id.
Id.
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now, judges and academics answer this question in conflicting
ways. Nevertheless, in light of the Supreme Court’s extended
discussion over privacy interests, it seems inevitable that the
law will trend toward greater rigor in digital search warrant
particularity. The question is what form that increased particularity requirement will take.
Currently, the particularity debate appears to occur on two
different planes. The first plane deals with the level of particularity that lower courts appear to demand. Some courts gloss
over defectively broad search warrants in order to preserve the
fruits of the search.145 Others reject search warrant applications for technical flaws and require substantial information
prior to authorizing a search.146 The second plane addresses
how search warrant particularity is achieved. There are currently two approaches to doing so: the first is a search protocol
that emphasizes how a search will be conducted; the second
focuses on a protocol identifying where on a device incriminating data will be sought.
The varied approaches across different jurisdictions will
likely require reconciliation post-Riley. As such, this Note argues that an ex ante search protocol detailing the Government’s search methodology is beneficial for all parties involved.
Such a requirement is easily reconcilable with the limited resources available to forensic examiners while also protecting
individuals’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights. However, such
a search protocol cannot practically specify where on a device
incriminating evidence will be found, and to require that information before the search is even conducted would unduly
hamper law enforcement officials.
A. Conflicts in Particularity Deference Among the Lower
Courts
Following Riley, all courts require search warrants prior to
the police searching a mobile device, but the stringency of the
warrant language varies. Lower courts are currently divided
between affording police “reasonableness” deference versus
mandating comprehensive search protocols in mobile device
145
See, e.g., United States v. Horton, No. 12-228, 2013 WL 3833250, at *3
(E.D. Pa. July 25, 2013) (noting that the “language of the warrant used to seize
Horton’s cell phone, though less clear, sufficiently permitted that seizure”).
146
See, e.g., In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 78–80 (D.D.C.
2014) (rejecting a search warrant application for not clearly articulating an intended search procedure, but noting the absence of a search protocol requirement
in the case law and “concerns about hamstringing a valid criminal investigation
by binding the government to a strict search protocol ex ante”).
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search warrants. This debate reflects the same tensions arising from computer search cases. But unlike in computer
search cases, a number of courts appear willing to preemptively restrict law enforcement access to data rather than wait
for a suppression hearing.
1. “Reasonableness” Deference and Its Problems
Courts generally adopting “reasonableness” deference employ similar logic as that used in computer search cases. They
do so by granting significant leeway in warrant terminology in
order to preserve the fruits of the search. For example, in
United States v. Horton, the court read the term “computer” in a
search warrant application to include a Motorola smartphone
when denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of
child pornography.147 In Horton, the defendant was served
with a warrant permitting officers to
search for and seize “[a]ll computer hardware, including, but
not limited to, any equipment which can collect, analyze,
create, display, convert, store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic, optical or similar computer impulses or
data.”148

The warrant also authorized officers to seize any “internal and
peripheral storage devices” associated with the computer.149
Denying the motion, the court opined that “the warrant could
have more clearly articulated that it covered cell phones” by
identifying them as additional items subject to search and
seizure.150 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the “language of
the warrant used to seize Horton’s cell phone, though less
clear, sufficiently permitted that seizure.”151
Similarly, in Hedgepath v. Commonwealth,152 the defendant challenged the particularity of a warrant used to search
his phone.153 The defendant was called to the local police station for questioning after the assault and death of his girlfriend.154 He was arrested, and the police searched his car the
following day, under a search warrant that authorized the
147

See Horton, 2013 WL 3833250, at *2.
Id. at *1 (alteration in original).
149
Id.
150
Id. at *3. The court cited the Third Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Karrer, 460 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2012), as an example of a more detailed search
warrant.
151
Id.
152
441 S.W.3d 119 (Ky. 2014).
153
See id. at 130.
154
See id. at 122.
148
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seizure of “any and all items that may have been used to aid in
the assault” without additional particularity.155 The police
seized his smartphone, and although the warrant did not specify a search for any digital content, they searched the phone for
evidence of the victim’s assault.156 The search revealed ten
graphic, incriminating videos of the defendant sexually assaulting and abusing the victim.157
The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s motion to suppress the digital evidence.158 The court acknowledged that “the warrant did not limit the parts of the cell phone
that could be searched, or the types of files or data that were to
be sought.”159 But it held that the “clear thrust of the warrant”
governed the police’s search.160 For this court, it was sufficient
that the warrant identified the cell phone itself, and not any of
the phone’s content.161
What is striking about Horton and Hedgepath is that each
court acknowledges defects in the mobile device search warrants but makes a concerted effort to gloss over the flaws in
order to uphold the collected data.162 This is where the risk of
an ex post review of the warrant becomes problematic: the
evidence collected may prove too crucial to uphold the conviction of a dangerous defendant. In contrast, had there been a
more stringent review mechanism prior to the data collection,
then the courts’ strained arguments would prove unnecessary.
Indeed, even though the evidence against the defendants in
Horton and Hedgepath was collected pursuant to warrants, it is
155
Id. at 126–27, 130. The warrant authorized seizure of “any and all items
that may have been used to aid in the assault . . . [and a search of] any and all
places in size where any of the above described personal property may be stored,
hidden, and/or concealed. Also all personal property including but not limited to
all electronic equipment, computers, and cell phones.” See id. at 130.
156
See id. at 122–23, 130–31.
157
See id. at 122–23.
158
See id. at 131.
159
Id. at 130.
160
Id.
161
See id. (“And the simple fact is that the police in this case had a search
warrant that specifically included Hedgepath’s cell phone as an item to be seized
in a search of his apartment and vehicle. This was not a warrantless search of the
sort condemned in Riley.” (citations omitted)).
162
Indeed, the facts of both Horton and Hedgepath suggest that courts may
hesitate to condemn defective search warrants in light of the evidence obtained to
convict particularly egregious perpetrators. Cf. Trepel, supra note 72, at 136
(“Unfortunately, the particularly distasteful nature of [the cases in question] may
unconsciously influence decision makers . . . to believe that stronger protections
against general computer searches are unnecessary.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN104.txt

212

unknown

Seq: 26

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

28-OCT-15

12:42

[Vol. 101:187

doubtful that the warrants’ broad language would pass muster
under the privacy concerns articulated in Riley.163
2. Approaches to Enhanced Warrant Particularity
In contrast, a number of courts now demand greater
search warrant particularity at the outset in order to control
police searches. For example, in State v. Henderson,164 the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that a warrant “satisfies the
particularity requirement if it leaves nothing about its scope to
the discretion of the officer serving it.”165 In Henderson, the
Nebraska Supreme Court declined to comment upon whether
“a court issuing a warrant has the authority to—or should—set
forth a protocol specifying how the search of digital data should
be conducted.”166
But a mandatory search-protocol regime has its advocates.
One of the most notable proponents is U.S. Magistrate Judge
John Facciola, sitting in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. In a series of three decisions—In re
Search of Black iPhone 4,167 In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus
Tablet,168 and In re Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI
013888003738427169 (collectively, the “D.C. Opinions”)—
Judge Facciola laid out a number of particularity concerns and
a rectifying protocol framework that a number of other judges
have cited.170 Considering the genesis of the D.C. Opinions’
protocol framework helps elucidate a workable process that the
Government can use to increase warrant particularity and reduce the risk of losing valuable evidence at a later suppression
hearing.
In In re Search of Black iPhone 4, the Government submitted six search-and-seizure applications for various devices for
163
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (cautioning that a
“phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than
previously possible”).
164
854 N.W.2d 616 (Neb. 2014).
165
Id. at 633 (citing United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 410 (7th Cir. 2014)).
166
Id. at 633.
167
27 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2014).
168
28 F. Supp. 3d 40 (D.D.C. 2014).
169
31 F. Supp. 3d 159 (D.D.C. 2014).
170
In In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com, 13 F. Supp.
3d 157, 163–67 (D.D.C. 2014), Chief Judge Richard W. Roberts declined to follow
Judge Facciola’s recommendations in In re Search of Black iPhone 4 and In re
Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet. Nevertheless, Judge Facciola’s recommendations remain persuasive to other courts. See, e.g., In re Nextel Cellular Telephone,
No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, *6–9 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014) (citing
the D.C. Opinions to form the court’s own opinion).
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evidence of child pornography.171 The warrant applications incorporated the traditional Attachment A, which describes the
device to be searched, and Attachment B, which lists the files
or data to be seized.172 In this case, Attachment A identified
three mobile phones and three hard drives.173 However, a generalized Attachment B was used to describe the types of files
sought from all the devices.174 Put differently, each application’s Attachment B identified files specific to mobile phones
and not hard drives.175
The court denied the warrant applications for several reasons. But beyond the “wrong” Attachment Bs, the court’s primary concern was that the Government sought data for which
there was no probable cause.176 Indeed, the court charged that
the government apparently seeks to seize the entirety of these
phones, including all communications, regardless of whether
they bear any relevance whatsoever to this investigation. If
this were not the intention, then Attachment B would not
begin by saying that the government wishes to seize “[a]ll
records . . . including . . .”; by using the term “including,” the
Applications make the seizure list broader than the categories that are specifically listed.177

The court concluded that the only way for the government to
rectify the risk of overseizure was by “explaining in a revised
application its intended search protocol.”178 Specifically, the
court sought guidance for how the search would limit review of
the target’s private information.179
171

See In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 75–76.
See id. at 76. For a brief review of standard warrant terminology and the
warrant application process, see supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
173
See In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 76.
174
See id. at 76–77.
175
See id. at 77 (quipping that the government must have “clearly submitted
the wrong Attachment B” because the “government has once again used formulaic
language without careful review”).
176
See id. at 77–78. The warrant requested authority to seize all stored contacts, text messages, calls, sent and received images, and voicemails. See id. at
76. The court found that the application failed to articulate sufficient probable
cause to necessitate seizing all of this information. See id. at 78.
177
Id. at 78 (alterations in original).
178
Id. at 79.
179
See id. The court asked for the protocol to answer the following questions:
“[1] Will all of [the] devices be imaged? [2] For how long will these images be
stored? [3] Will a dedicated computer forensics team perform the search based on
specific criteria from the investigating officers of what they are looking for, or will
the investigating officers be directly involved? [4] What procedures will be used to
avoid viewing material that is not within the scope of the warrant? [5] If the
government discovers unrelated incriminating evidence, will it return for a separate search and seizure warrant?” Id. at 79–80.
172
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Nine days later, in In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet,180 the court issued a new opinion denying another set of
government search warrant applications. Like in In re Search
of Black iPhone 4, the government applied for search warrants
seeking evidence of child pornography on a tablet, a digital
camera, a cell phone, and a laptop.181 This time, the government included an “Attachment C,” which incorporated a formal
search protocol.182 However, the court still rejected the warrant applications because the proposed Attachment C “fail[ed]
to adequately detail the proposed search protocol and thus
fail[ed] to adequately address the [c]ourt’s concerns.”183
In this case, the proposed search protocol attempted to
directly address the questions posed in In re Search of Black
iPhone 4.184 First, it stated that the United States would make
available to interested persons any copies of the data collected,
“[t]o the extent practical.”185 It then provided that the government would create mirror images of the devices, and perform
any searches based off of the copies.186 The government then
stated that “after inspecting the device[s] or computer system[s]
. . . the computer specialist conducting the forensic examination” would determine whether the devices contain evidence of
the crimes outlined in Attachment B.187 If the devices do not
contain such evidence, they would be returned. The search
protocol concluded that the government would hold any seized
data until all appeals are exhausted.188
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the government’s protocol was insufficient.189 The court judged that “Attachment C is
far from a paragon of clarity” and that it failed to address “the
Court’s concerns by explaining how the search will occur and
how the government will avoid overseizure by avoiding keeping
documents and other information outside the scope of Attachment B.”190 Beyond data retention concerns,191 the court also
180

28 F. Supp. 3d 40 (D.D.C. 2014).
See id. at 41–42.
182
Id. at 42–43.
183
Id. at 41.
184
See id. at 42–44. Judge Facciola’s questions in In re Search of Black iPhone
4 are outlined supra, in note 179.
185
In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 43.
186
See id.
187
Id.
188
See id.
189
See id. at 44.
190
Id.
191
See id. at 45 (“[T]he government intends to wholly image these devices and
store them ‘until the target/defendant’s appeals and habeas proceedings are concluded.’ . . . This is unacceptable.”).
181
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asserted that the search protocol “provides no actual search
protocol.”192 Instead, the court demanded that “the government needs to provide a sophisticated technical overview of
how it plans to conduct the search.”193
Subsequently, in In re Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI
013888003738427,194 the government submitted its third attempt to comply with the court’s specifications. This time, the
government replaced the Attachment C search protocol with an
FBI forensic scientist’s affidavit. In the affidavit, the forensic
scientist detailed his experience with searching mobile devices
and his intended use of “[t]raditionally used forensic methods”
such as keyword searches and “computer-assisted scans of the
entire medium,” with a plan to destroy any discovered information that fell outside the warrant.195
Once again, the court rejected the warrant application.196
However, the court noted that its “remaining quibble is that,
unlike in In re Search of Odys Loox, the government does not
specify here that the iPhone will be imaged.”197 The court emphasized that explaining whether the imaging process occurs is
important because “there will be a complete copy of all [of the
device’s] data . . . that must be accounted for.”198 Any data
accessed without probable cause would need to be filtered out
and purged from the government systems.199
The court then explicitly detailed its vision for an appropriate search protocol that would comport with the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements.
In addition to accounting for and destroying any collected data
for which the government lacks probable cause, the court
sought a technical explanation for how the search would be
conducted.200 The court reasoned:
[A]n explanation of the scientific methodology the government will use to separate what is permitted to be seized from
what is not, will explain to the Court how the government will
decide where it is going to search—and it is thus squarely
aimed at satisfying the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.201
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id. at 46.
Id.
31 F. Supp. 3d 159 (D.D.C. 2014).
Id. at 163.
See id. at 165–66.
Id.
Id. at 166.
See id.
See id. at 166–67.
Id. at 166.
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Specifically, the court urged that the government ought not shy
away from using technical language such as “MD5 hash values,” “metadata,” “registry,” “write blocking,” and “status
marker,” or from detailing the software programs the government intended to use.202 This would enable the court to understand “how [the government] will determine which blocks
should be searched for data within the scope of the warrant.”203 The goal, the court concluded, is to constrain the
government to running searches that “minimize the risk that
files outside the scope of the warrant will be discovered.”204
The D.C. Opinions proved divisive but influential among a
number of lower courts.205 However, the D.C. Opinions’ emphasis on search methodology is not the only approach used by
courts. A different search protocol variant is exemplified in In
re Search of a Nextel Cellular Telephone.206 Here, the Nextel
court’s approach differs from the D.C. Opinions’ approach by
demanding ex ante determinations as to where the searches
would be conducted.207
In Nextel, the warrant’s search protocol was similar in text
to the application in In re Search of Black iPhone 4. It generally
provided for an “examination of all of the data contained in
such cellular telephone hardware,” executed by “surveying various file directories and the individual files they contain.”208
In this case, the court rejected the warrant application because, “as written, [it] will result in the overseizure of data and
indefinite storage of data that it lacks probable cause to
seize.”209 The court then surveyed the D.C. Opinions, noting
that they were persuasive in formulating its own holding.210
202

See id. at 168.
Id. at 167.
204
Id. at 168.
205
Compare In re Search of a Nextel Cellular Telephone, No. 14-MJ-8005DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *9 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014) (advocating for search
protocols), with United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14-CR-68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039,
at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014) (refusing to require search protocols for criminal
investigations because “[t]hat was not real life”).
206
No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 WL 2898262 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014).
207
Indeed, it is notable that the Nextel court approvingly cites to In re Search
of Apple iPhone and its predecessors for what should be incorporated in a search
protocol. See In re Nextel, 2014 WL 2898262, at *9, *12. However, it fails to cite to
any of the D.C. Opinions when discussing a search protocol requirement articulating where evidence would be sought on a device. See id. at *13.
208
Id. at *2; see also In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 76–77
(D.D.C. 2014) (utilizing similarly general language in its Attachment B: Specific
Items To Be Seized).
209
In re Nextel, 2014 WL 2898262, at *10.
210
See id. at *6–9.
203
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However, the Nextel court went further than the D.C. Opinions’ search protocols by demanding specific information about
where in the device’s memory the government intended to
search for evidence of criminal activity.211 To support this development, the court relied on a single line of In re Search of
Apple iPhone, which questioned “where [the government] will
search (which ‘parts’—or blocks—of the iPhone’s NAND flash
drive).”212 But it appears that the query in In re Search of Apple
iPhone sought a description of the general process, rather than
a list of each application and block of memory in which the
government would conduct its search.213 Indeed, In re Search
of Apple iPhone actually asked “how the government intends to
determine where it will search . . . and how those decisions with
respect to how the search will be conducted” would limit exploratory rummaging.214
Nevertheless, the Nextel court insisted that “an acceptable
search protocol educates (1) the [c]ourt as to what the government is doing when it searches a cell phone, and (2) the executing officer as to what places and things may or may not be
searched and/or seized.”215 As the Nextel court quipped,
“probable cause to believe drug trafficking communication may
be found in phone’s the [sic] mail application will not support
the search of the phone’s Angry Birds application.”216 In essence, the Nextel opinion demands more than a search protocol; it requires a predetermined list of where incriminating
evidence is believed to reside.
B. How a Search Protocol Looks
The foregoing cases provide compelling rationales for the
concerns warranting a mandatory search protocol regime. Yet
the actual effort of incorporating such a search protocol into a
warrant application need not be burdensome. Take, as a
model, the process-based search-protocol format proposed in
the D.C. Opinions. Putting together the D.C. Opinions, an ex
ante search protocol requires a technical explanation of the
search procedure, drawn upon experience and current
211

See id. at *11–13.
Id. at *9 (quoting In re Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427, 31
F. Supp. 3d 159, 167 (D.D.C. 2014)).
213
See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (“The Court is not
dictating that particular terms or search methods should be used.”).
214
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
215
In re Nextel Cellular Telephone, 2014 WL 2898262, at *13 (emphasis
added).
216
Id.
212
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software offerings.217 To some extent, the forensic examiners
must be equipped to explain what data is sought and, therefore, the extent of the search process that they wish to employ.218 Moreover, the government must be prepared to
articulate its process for copying the device’s contents for analysis, how examiners will identify and isolate information
outside the scope of the search warrant, and its plans to purge
the information as efficiently as possible.219 Finally, the government must account for the participants in the search process, presumably to control for who has access to a target’s
personal information.220
This information can take the form of a simple document
attachment, as described in In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus
Tablet.221 Indeed, the D.C. Opinions already suggest that all
“the government [needs] to do is explain how it is going to
conduct this search” with requests modeled on rote processes
already employed by the forensic labs.222 Such an explanation
would likely incorporate, either directly or by reference, the
standard-form operating procedures employed by forensic
scientists, which are then tailored to the offense based on the
investigators’ guidance.223 The content simply needs to be
transposed into a workable document attachment that can be
reviewed in conjunction with the rest of the warrant
application.
C. Why a Process-Based Search Protocol Makes Sense
Nevertheless, imposing a search protocol requirement only
makes sense if its focus remains on process rather than data
217

See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168–69.
See id.; In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 46
(D.D.C. 2014); see also supra notes 118–137 and accompanying text for a discussion of different forms of mobile device forensic examination.
219
See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 165–67; In re Search of
ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 45–46; In re Search of Black iPhone 4,
27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79–80 (D.D.C. 2014).
220
In re Search of ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46; In re Search of
Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 79–80.
221
See 28 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
222
In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168.
223
For a discussion of why forensic processes are necessarily carefully
planned and catalogued, see supra notes 121–135 and accompanying text. See
also In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (“All the Court is asking
the government to do is explain how it is going to conduct this search to minimize
the risk that files outside the scope of the warrant will be discovered. . . . The
government searches hard drives and cell phones on a regular basis—this Court
is aware of this fact because warrant applications for these devices are a regular
occurrence.”).
218
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location. A process-based focus yields two notable benefits:
First, it enhances the particularity within a search warrant,
which increases the target’s privacy protection and comports
with the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, frontloading clarification of the government’s search process can limit the number of
successful suppression challenges. Second, the enhanced particularity comes at little to no cost to the government, since the
current state of forensic technology requires clearly identifying
in advance the search goals to prevent data loss. The protocol
drafting process need not be daunting, since it reflects the
government’s common experience with searching mobile
devices.
The rising trend of the “post-PC” era means that mobile
devices contain vast quantities of personal information exceeding even that of traditional computers.224 As the Riley Court
noted, mobile phones may now provide “a digital record of
nearly every aspect of [individuals’] lives.”225 So while broadly
drafted warrants have efficiency benefits, broad language can
result in data extraction previously unsupported with probable
cause.226 This runs afoul of the very privacy concerns the Riley
Court articulated.227
Moreover, an unduly broad search creates a real risk of
having valuable evidence suppressed by a pretrial motion or,
worse, having a conviction overturned.228 But by having a
search protocol that articulates the forensic examiner’s procedure, an impartial magistrate would have the opportunity to
thoroughly review the scope of the search.229 Magistrate review
of a detailed search protocol could better protect the viability of
any evidence the police recovered. A search protocol would

224
See, e.g., James O’Toole, Mobile Apps Overtake PC Internet Usage in U.S.,
CNN MONEY (Feb. 28, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/28/
technology/mobile/mobile-apps-internet/ [http://perma.cc/L522-DC25] (reporting that mobile devices “accounted for 55% of Internet usage in the United States”
in January 2014).
225
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
226
See In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77–78 (D.D.C.
2014).
227
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (“[A] cell phone search would typically expose
to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house . . . .”).
228
Cf. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999) (suppressing evidence of child pornography because investigators went beyond the
scope of their search warrant).
229
See In re Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427, 31 F. Supp. 3d
159, 166, 168 (D.D.C. 2014).
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also align with the warrant process’s deliberative benefits so
favored by the Supreme Court.230
And as discussed at several points throughout this Note,
the very nature of the mobile device forensic process already
supports incorporating search protocols into warrant applications. The short product cycles inherent in consumer mobile
technology create limitations on forensic software usability.231
Therefore, careful deliberation is required in order to ensure
that any pertinent data is not lost.232 By simply transcribing
the technical procedure the forensic examiner intends to undertake to recover data from the mobile device, the government’s work is already accomplished. The only wrinkle in the
process is that investigators should provide specific input
about how such a search would be tailored to the offense at
hand.233
But an explanation of how a search is conducted is significantly different from where the search process will take place
on the device. The Nextel opinion’s divergence from the D.C.
Opinions to require an ex ante determination of where the forensic search would be conducted likely would result in overly
burdening and directing the government’s search process.234
First, forensic examiners may have limited data-extraction capabilities resulting purely from which software the government
body procured.235 This means that identifying a specific file
location for extraction and review may simply be infeasible.236
The Fourth Amendment’s “place to be searched” generally cannot be narrower than identifying the device. Second, just because end users cannot as flexibly mask file names, locations,
or extensions on mobile devices compared to traditional computers does not mean that investigators know, ex ante, where
the evidence may lie.237 Instead, a detailed and approved
search methodology, rather than a list of data locations, realis230
See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 61, § 4.1(a) (citing Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964)).
231
See Gonzalez & Hung, supra note 115, at 1.
232
See NIST GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 15–16.
233
See In re Search of Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2014)
(requiring probable cause for data extracted from the mobile device). The probable cause would necessarily come from law enforcement officers who are directly
involved in the criminal investigation.
234
Cf. In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (“The Court is not
dictating that particular terms or search methods should be used.”).
235
See NIST GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 25.
236
Cf. id. at 21–23 tbl.3 (comparing the capabilities of a variety of forensic
software packages).
237
See supra notes 139–144 and accompanying text.
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tically guides criminal investigations while providing more privacy protection for the target.
CONCLUSION
Riley drew a line in the sand in favor of individual privacy
rights. The Court took a step forward in adapting modern technology to traditional Fourth Amendment protections. However,
the Riley privacy rights discussion left open the glaring question of how much latitude law enforcement officers have when
searching a device with a warrant. As discussed, courts, including the Riley Court, considered the practical burdens on
law enforcement in light of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. With such attention to practical—not doctrinal—considerations, it is evident that considering the factual
circumstances underlying forensic searches is crucial before
announcing a new doctrine in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that mobile devices are
currently so unique in both technological development and
daily use that an intermediate standard is required for search
warrant particularity. Therefore, law enforcement officers
should be afforded practical deference when conducting their
search, but they also must bear the burden to articulate their
methodology in an ex ante search protocol. This approach preserves the disciplined, moderated review by an impartial magistrate judge, in line with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
while recognizing that some flexibility is required when searching for evidence in a vast, virtual space.
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